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My thanks to Kenneth Himma for organizing this symposium on my book Naturalizing
Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and Naturalism in Legal Philosophy1 and to the editors
of Law & Philosophy for agreeing to host it. I am especially grateful to the contributors—Julie Dickson,
Michael Steven Green, and Mark Greenberg—for their thoughtful and detailed engagement with my
work. I learned from their essays, even when I disagreed, and I also found much that I agree with. In
what follows, I shall focus mainly on the remaining points of scholarly disagreement, ones where further
progress might be made or where I think my original view of the matter still has some merit, the
criticisms notwithstanding. I shall start by addressing the essay by Green, which takes up my
interpretation of the American Legal Realists (hereafter “Realists”). I shall then turn to broader
methodological issues in jurisprudence that arise in the essays by Greenberg (though his is also related
to the issue of how to understand Realism) and Dickson.
Reply to Michael Green
Green’s scholarly and informative essay takes up two distinct issues: first, whether I am right
that the Realists confined their claim about the rational indeterminacy of legal reasoning to those cases
that reach the stage of appellate review; and second, whether I am right that the Realists did not
embrace a “prediction theory of law,” but, instead, were tacit legal positivists. Green answers (roughly)
1

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

1

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1847829

in the affirmative on the first point, and in the negative on the second (though he thinks his own answer
is consistent with my emphasis on the Realists’ naturalism about adjudication).2 He makes instructive
points on both fronts, and so I shall highlight (just briefly) some points of agreement on the first, and
then comment (at somewhat greater length) on some grounds for skepticism about some of what he
says regarding the second.3
Green does a nice job explaining the context of remarks by Jerome Frank that appear to endorse
the global indeterminacy of legal reasoning,4 but in fact are compatible with my thesis about the
restricted scope of the indeterminacy thesis. Green also adduces striking evidence that Felix Cohen and
Walter Wheeler Cook were proto-Keslenians who thought every judicial decision involved a moral
decision by the judge about what ought to be done, but I am less sure this conflicts with my claim that,
“[o]One is hard-pressed to find the Realists expressing much interest in questions of political
obligation.”5 The “question” of political obligation is the question when and whether the fact that a
norm is legally valid means there is a moral obligation for the judge to comply with it.6 Green’s
evidence suggests that the Realists, like the tacit legal positivists I claim they are, do not think legal
validity entails a moral obligation to comply, though even Green does not contend either that the

2

Michael Steven Green, “Leiter on the Legal Realists,” (first two pages).

3

Towards the end of his paper, Green does repeat Mark Greenberg’s confusion about Quine’s argument
for naturalized epistemology. I take this up in the discussion of Greenberg, below, so won’t belabor it here.
4

Green, sections 3 and 4 of his paper.

5

Naturalizing Jurisprudence, p. 118 n. 68.

6

Cf. Leslie Green, “Law and Obligations,” in The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law,
ed. J. Coleman & S. Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
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Realists have actual arguments for this position, or that they have a considered view about when judges
ought to comply with the law.7
Green, like Michael Moore,8 thinks I am wrong to deny that most Realists accepted a “prediction
theory of law,” that is, a view according to which the concept of law is best understood as a prediction
of what a court will do. Some of the cites citations and quotes quotations Green offers in support9 are
of a piece with material I myself cited, and which do nothing to settle the issue. 10 No one, after all, has
denied that the Realists often spoke of law as a prediction of what the courts will do, the question is
always what they meant by doing so. But Green has a more precise and interesting challenge.
First, Green pries apart two kinds of skeptical claims about law associated with the Realists: one
is the “prediction theory,” just mentioned, but the other is the “decision theory” according to which the
decision of the court is the law, and nothing else is the law. Green adduces compelling evidence that
Frank, in fact, embraced the “decision theory,” not just, as I claimed, for the client’s perspective, but

7

Regarding Jerome Frank, Green says, “If Freudian psychoanalysis really can explain judges’ personalities,
decisions would not be unpredictable after all.” Green, p. __ after n. 58. But my point was precisely that the
Freudian theory of the mind is metaphysically determinate, but from the standpoint of any observer (other than
the analyst of the judge!), the decision will be epistemically indeterminate. See Naturalizing Jurisprudence, p 26 n.
59. Green is right to point out that Frank invoked Freud in part to explain why people need to believe in “legal
certainty,” and Frank’s revisionary account of his own view in a footnote in the preface to the sixth printing of the
book (cited by Green at p. __) is certainly striking. Frank was, of course, a fairly orthodox Freudian, and the
Freudian picture of the mind involved psychic determinism. That surely explains why Frank, as late as Courts on
Trial (194_) “urge*d+…each prospective judge *to+ undergo something like a psychoanalysis” (Courts on Trial: Myth
and Reality in American Justice [1973 edition], p. 250), a recommendation consistent with his earlier observation in
Law and the Modern Mind (1930, p. 123) that “*w+e shall not learn how judges think until the judges are able to
engage in ventures of self-discovery”—psychoanalytic ventures, obviously.
8

I dispute Moore’s objection in Naturalizing Jurisprudence, pp. 103-107.

9

See esp. p. __ n. 72 (citing Radin and Llewellyn).

10

See Naturalizing Jurisprudence, pp. 17-18, 25-29, 104-105.
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also even for the judge’s perspective on the law.11 This, alas, just confirms one’s general impression of
Frank’s muddle-headedness, but as Green notes, Frank later recanted his account,12 and Llewellyn, of
course, denied holding any such view.13 The good news, then, from the standpoint of Realism, as well as
my interpretation of it, is that there is no evidence that Llewellyn, Herman Oliphant, Max Radin,
Underhill Moore, or Leon Green—among other major Realists-- accepted the absurd “decision theory,”
and that Frank even regretted endorsing it at one time.14
With regard to the “prediction theory” proper, Green emphasizes Felix Cohen’s commitment to
it, but also Walter Wheeler Cook’s, about which Green’s evidence is prima facie persuasive.15 Green
notes that I had, of course, acknowledged Cohen’s commitment to the prediction theory, but then
makes the silly observation that, “It is awkward that Leiter’s ‘philosophical reconstruction of Legal
Realism’ should relegate to the sidelines the one realist [i.e., Cohen] who had a PhD in philosophy—from
Harvard.”16 The point, however, of a philosophical reconstruction is to make good philosophical sense
of a theoretical position, not simply to describe the views, however confused, of people with PhDs in
philosophy. Cohen was clearly a mediocre mind, his PhD “from Harvard” notwithstanding. The real

11

Green, circa n. 77 ff., and esp. nn. 85-86

12

Green, circa n. 95-96

13

Green circa nn. 93-94. Green claims that Llewellyn later “repudiated” the “decision theory” (n. 95), but
the passages he cites to show that Llewellyn ever held it, from the second edition of The Bramble Bush, refer not
to the “decision theory,” but to the claims about “predicting” what courts will do.
14

Green takes issue with my claim that it is obviously anachronistic to read the Realists as
proferringproffering claims about the “concept” of law, on the grounds that even John Austin was interested in a
“definition of positive law.” Green circa nn. 91-92. This. This is unpersuasive on two counts: first, it would require
a showing that the American Realists were influenced by the Austinian approach; and second, Hart’s program of
conceptual analysis was not supposed to be definitional, as Hart never tired of emphasizing.
15

Green, ___. I neglected Cook in my original discussion, so Green is right to call attention to Cook’s view.

16

Green circa n. 103
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question at issue, in any case, is whether it is necessary to make sense of the jurisprudence of most
Realists to saddle them with a commitment to the prediction theory, and, on this score, as I read him,
Green agrees with me that it is not: “since the prediction theory is a non-standard theory of law, Leiter’s
observation that the realists did not employ it when making claims about legal indeterminacy applies.”17
Green’s ambitious attempt to square the “prediction theory” with Hartian positivism stalls over the
problem that the “prediction theory” does not appear to have any room for the internal point of view,
as Green appears to recognize.18 He correctly concludes that we should understand Realists like Cohen
(and perhaps Cook) as proposing a reforming definition of the concept of law, 19 though the reasons to
think such a reform worthwhile are not addressed, and would, in any case, be a subject for a different
day.
Reply to Mark Greenberg
In Naturalizing Jurisprudence, I replied20 to Greenberg’s as-of-then unpublished essay on the
analogy between Quine’s argument for naturalized epistemology and the Realist argument for
naturalizing the theory of adjudication (Greenberg’s originaly essay is, happily, now published in this
volume). Greenberg’s new essay here replies to my reply, and I fear that on certain issues (in particular,
whether there is an analogy between Realism and Quine’s argument for naturalized epistemology) we
would be well past the point of diminishing returns were my sur-reply to Greenberg’s reply to my reply
to his original essay go on at a length commensurate to his reply to my reply! Yet Greenberg’s new

17

Green, circa n. 131.

18

Green circa nn. 115, 123.

19

Green circa n. 126

20

Naturalizing Jurisprudence, pp. 112-118.
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essay—which will be my focus here--raises some issues that do merit more extended discussion, and I
will devote most of my space to those.
I’ll start with a few brief words about the old issue. Greenberg and I discussed these issues at
some length during his year in Austin in 2007, and I believed, and Greenberg confirms, 21 that we had
reached a kind of rapprochement: namely, that there are clear analogies between Quine’s argument for
naturalizing epistemology and the Realist argument for a causal-explanatory theory of judicial decisionmaking, but there are also ways in which the projects are disanalogous, depending on what one
emphasizes. The analogy between the Realist argument and Quine’s attack on foundationalism in
epistemology is straightforward:22: Quine suggested that if the foundationalist project of grounding the
special epistemic status of science in sense experience failed (as he argued it did, the upshot of his
semantic and confirmation holism), then we might as well replace that project with a naturalized kin,
one in which we explore the causal relationship between inputs (sense experience) and theoretical
output (the theories of science). So, too, the Realists (on my account) suggest that if we can’t justify
judicial decisions (the outputs) on the basis of the inputs (fact and legal reasons), then we might as well
examine the causal-explanatory relation between the two relata. I invoked Quine’s argument for
naturalized epistemology, by the way, not because I thought most philosophers agreed with Quine
(Greenberg seems unduly impressed by current consensus on this and other matters23), but because it
was an example familiar to philosophers of an argumentative strategy which would allow us to
21

As Greenberg wrote to me subsequent to sending me his second essay (and gave me permission to
quote): “I do certainly agree that there are levels of description at which there are analogies.”
22

See Naturalizing Jurisprudence, pp. 34-46, 63-64.

23

He says, e.g., that “Quine’s arguments are notoriously inadequate to support” his replacement
naturalism and that “normative epistemology has flourished” since Quine. Greenberg, *first page+ and notes 2 and
3 (emphasis added). Later, he claims that there is a “widespread recognition of the mismatch between Quine’s
arguments and his replacement proposal….” Greenberg, p. __ n. 16.

6

understand the Realists as not simply being confused. (I am, in fact, sympathetic to Quine and the
Realists on the merits, but we’ll return to that later.)
Now here’s an obvious disanalogy: Quine thinks that science is the basic arbiter of all matters
epistemic and metaphysical: if you want to know what there is and what we can know, look to the
sciences.24 Nobody, of course, thinks anything similar is true about law. Greenberg’s interest in
disanalogies turns largely on this latter point (though at least partly on a partial misunderstanding of
Quine, about which more in a moment). The following passage captures well, I think, what’s in dispute
between us. Greenberg writes:
The lesson of the failure of Cartesian foundationalism should be understood not as the thesis that
evidence cannot justify belief in scientific theories, but as the thesis that the project of providing a
foundation for science from outside of science is misguided. What Quine should be understood to
reject is not the possibility of justified belief in scientific theories, but rather the foundationalist’s
understanding of what kind of justification scientific theories require.25
Now Quine certainly thinks that we can not provide a foundation for science outside of science: that’s a
point I emphasized ad nauseam.26 But he also thinks that logic and evidence do not rationally compel
acceptance of any scientific hypothesis: that is, after all, the whole point of his famous claim about the
underdetermination of theory by evidence (i.e., his confirmation holism), about which Greenberg is
strikingly silent. If confirmation holism were false (and semantic holism were false), then we might
24

Peter Hylton’s Quine (London: Routledge, 2007) is particularly good on the radical naturalism of
Quine’s approach on this score.
25

Greenberg, p. __. Greenberg lays a lot of emphasis on the fact that he used the words “in effect” in
claiming Quine’s argument was a reductio (a point I disputed), but I think we can bracket the import of the
punctuation for purposes of the real issue.
26

See, e.g., Naturalizing Jurisprudence, pp. 146-149.

7

construct a rational justification for belief in scientific hypotheses, and a vindication of the special
epistemic status of science. But the failure of the foundationalist program from Descartes to Carnap is
supposed to show that this isn’t in the offing: particular scientific theories are accepted as true not
because of facts and logic but because of all the pragmatic norms of justification scientists employ and
that Quine and Ullian famously describe in The Web of Belief. So Quine, in fact, rejects—contra
Greenberg--both the foundationalist justification of particular scientific hypothesestheories and the idea
that science can be justified by philosophical standards external to science (Greenberg acknowledges
only the latter). But as I said in my original reply, “Quine thinks we have no vantage point on the kind of
question about justification the foundationalist was asking,”27 since, as Roger Gibson famously puts it28
in describing Quine’s view, “there is no Archimediean point of cosmic exile from which to leverage our
theory of the world.”29 Quine commits to science (confirmation holism notwithstanding) as the arbiter
of what there is and what we can know for pragmatic reasons,30 but that’s why a kind of pragmatism is
essential to Quine’s view,31 though invisible on Greenberg’s reconstruction. Greenberg calls attention to

27

Naturalizing Jurisprudence, p. 116.

28

Quoted at id.

29

Gibson, “Willard van Orman Quine,” in A Companion to Metaphysics, ed. J. Kim & E. Sosa (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1995), p. 427.
30

As I argued in Naturalizing Jurisprudence, p. 117. Thus, when I point out that according to the Realists,
appellate decisions are similarly underdetermined by the inputs, the analogy is, contra Greenberg (p. __ circa n. 12
& above), still quite intact and compatible with the Realist confidence in law and courts. The fact that law officially
“sets itself a standard of rationality determinacy that it fails to live up to” (Greenberg, p. __) is not in any way at all
an indictment of adjudication for the Realists: to be sure, they commend greater candor, but they think that
courts, despite the rhetorical obfscuation of their opinions, do remarkably well at identifying the normatively
significant features of disputes and resolving them accordingly.
31

See Brian Leiter, “Science and Morality: Pragmatic Reflections on Rorty’s Pragmatism,” University of
Chicago Law Review 74 (2008), esp. pp. 933-935.
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the respect in which Quine does not repudiate normative questions,32 but so did I of course.33 What
Greenberg does not mention is that Quine’s idea of “normative” epistemology is basically descriptive:
that is, a description of the norms that successful sciences actually use.
So let’s leave Quine interpretation behind. We will call a “Foundationalist Story” any normative
account of the following form34: given inputs X, Y and Z, only one output is justified. My claim was that
the Realists deny that we can tell a Foundationalist Story about judicial decision in appellate cases. The
Duhem-Quine thesis about the underdetermination of theory by evidence (among other considerations)
means that we cannot tell such a story about scientific hypotheses either. So why not do something
else, say the Realists and Quine: why not describe what kinds of inputs actually produce what kinds of
outputs? Greenberg, like a lot of Quine’s critics, seems confused about what this means. It certainly
does not rule out descriptive sociology about the norms--—simplicity, consilience, minimum mutilation
of evidence--that are actually employed by successful sciences in winnowing sensory input so that it
stands in a justificatory relationship with theoretical output. But not all of the “normative epistemology
that has flourished” since Quine, according to Greenberg,35 is that kind of descriptive sociology (which is
plainly correct). Greenberg, alas, seems unduly impressed by a very different kind of descriptive
sociology, namely, about what professors currently publish: e.g., he appeals to the fact that academics
currently produce armchair epistemology as evidence that it is “flourishing” and that therefore
“normative philosophical work” can not be “sterile.”36 But philosophical theology is, as a sociological

32

[cites]

33

Naturalizing Jurisprudence, p. 38 nn. 110, 111, p. 145.

34

This tracks what I said originally in Naturalizing Jurisprudence, pp. 39-40.

35

Greenberg, first page

36

Greenberg, p. __.
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fact about Anglophone philosophy, also “flourishing,” in the sense of proliferating, but it’s hard to
believe anyone really thinks that has any bearing on whether that philosophical enterprise is sterile or
fruitful. Greenberg, alas, repeats the same form of “argument” with respect to legal philosophy: again,
he notes—citing himself, Marmor, and Shapiro, among others—that normative projects about (as he
puts it in Dworkin-speak37) “the relation between the grounds of law and the content of law…are
flourishing.”38 But no part of my argument turned at all on what employed academics were publishing,
and so I assume Greenberg must mean something more: namely, that such work is philosophically
substantial and important. Alas, all he adduces by way of evidence is that it is written and published.
Let us put the sociology of what academics produce to one side, and turn to a more interesting
issue: have Quine or the Realists given us a good reason to replace Foundationalist Stories with causalexplanatory theories?39 Greenberg pronounces my use of the phrase “theory of adjudication”
“unusual,”40 and I am afraid I can only return the compliment, with one qualification: “theory of
adjudication” has no standard usage at all (Greenberg adduces no contrary evidence, his
37

He even says later that “the relation of the determinants or grounds of legal content to the content of
the law is a central question in philosophy of law. It is perhaps the central project of what is sometimes called
‘general jurisprudence.’” Id. at p. __ (circa n. 21). I am not sure I recognize this as a description of the tradition of
general jurisprudence in the twentieth-century. General jurisprudence in writers like Kelsen, Hart, and Raz has
been concerned with what is distinctive of those norms that are legally valid, validity being the mode of existence
of norms, as Kelsen says. This might have been what Greenberg means by the “grounds of legal content,” except
he thinks it is a further question what the relationship is between the “grounds of legal content” and “the content
of law.” But the criteria of legal validity fix the content of the law (at least, when they are not themselves
indeterminate), so there would be, on this reading, no puzzle about the relationship between the “grounds of legal
content” and “the content of the law”: the former fix the latter, unless indeterminate.
38

[cite]

39

It was actually no part of my argument in the papers on Realism to argue that the Realist case for
‘replacement naturalism’ was persuasive, though I am sympathetic to it. It was, rather, to show that we could
make sense of what they were doing from a (naturalistic) philosophical point of view, even if we rejected their
position.
40

Greenberg, p. __.
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pronouncements notwithstanding), so writing as though there is a usual meaning is, itself, “unusual.” I
was quite clear, as Greenberg’s discussion reveals, about what I meant by it, and so the real question is
whether anyone is committed to a Foundationalist Story about the theory of adjudication.41 Greenberg,
however, makes the surprising claim that no one is so committed. (I will follow Greenberg in ignoring
figures like Blackstone—ancient history, after all—and focus only on the present.) Recognizing that
Dworkin is one possible target of the Realist critique as I reconstruct it, Greenberg claims that “the rightanswer thesis is not central to Dworkin’s project.”42 The right-answer thesis—the idea that every case
has a right answer as a matter of law—would be an example of a Foundationalist Story about
adjudication, and so the Realist critique would then have a potent, living target. When Greenberg
claims the Foundationalist aspect of Dworkin’s theory isn’t central, he is not making a claim about the
amount of effort Dworkin devotes to defending the right-answer thesis, which is obviously substantial.43
Greenberg’s real claim is that the Dworkin of Law’s Empire is not necessarily committed to the rightanswer thesis (the earlier Dworkin obviously is, though Greenberg doesn’t concede the point quite that
plainly). I rather agree with Greenberg that Dworkin “is most concerned to establish…that law depends
in a particular way on morality” and that “the right-answer thesis…is a downstream consequence of his
overall theory of law in conjunction with his view about morality”44 So far, this is just a complicated
admission that Dworkin accepts a Foundationalist Story about adjudication; the best Greenberg can do

41

A word in passing about Greenberg’s repeated confusion about what I said about “predicting” judicial
decisions. See Greenberg, pp. __-__. I did not attribute an interest in predicting judicial decisions to anyone other
than the Realists. The Realists were practical folks, thinking about the needs of lawyers, and so they thought being
able to reliable predict judicial behavior would be useful. I realize that this view is not shared by other legal
philosophers, and I did not claim otherwise.
42

[cite]

43

See, e.g., Chapters 4 and 13 in Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1977); Chapters 5 and 7 in A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985).
44

Greenberg, p. __ (circa n. 25).
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is assert “that most of *Dworkin’s+ arguments could succeed consistent with the falsity of the rightanswer thesis.”45 Greenberg does not show that this is Dworkin’s view, and it is certainly not Dworkin’s
view in his early work, since the “retroactivity” objection to legal positivism46 turns, quite clearly, on the
truth of the right-answer thesis. Greenberg may be correct that one could have a view about the
nature of morality different than Dworkin’s and give up the right-answer thesis: John Mackie would be a
case in point, though not the one Greenberg has in mind, and not one Dworkin would be happy with.
But none of this changes the fact that the actual Ronald Dworkin holds a theory of adjudication involving
the Foundationalist Story because he holds a particular view about law and morality.
Greenberg, to his credit, acknowledges that “if the indeterminacy thesis is correct, then not all
of Dworkin’s arguments are successful.”47 That also means that if the Realist claim about indeterminacy
is correct, then the Foundationalist Story is not successful. But I do agree with Greenberg that, “It is
not at all obvious… what should be rejected” in those circumstances.48 I also agree that the Realists
were not directly addressing Dworkin’s arguments, since he was a babe when they were writing.49 I
even agree that the central Realist argument for the indeterminacy of law—namely, the existence of
what lawyers and judges take to be equally legitimate but conflicting canons of interpretation for
authoritative sources of law—is one to which Dworkin could respond. Of course, I have other
arguments in Naturalizing Jurisprudence that undermine Dworkin’s position,50 but it was no part of my
45

Id.

46

Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977), Chapter 2.[cite]

47

Greenberg, p. __.

48

Id. [same]

49

I’m a bit puzzled why Greenberg bothers to make this point (id. at __ [a bit before n. 27]), since I never
claimed otherwise.
50

See, e.g., Chapter 8, “Objectivity, Morality and Adjudication.”
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thesis about the Realists that they supply all the arguments for giving up Foundationalist Stories about
adjudication. My primary ambition was to give a rational reconstruction of the Realist position that
would show why they might have been motivated to replace a normative account of adjudication with a
causal-explanatory account. It is a separate question whether they had good reasons for that project,
though especially against their Blackstonian formalist targets, I should think they did—and on that point,
Greenberg is also silent. As it happens, I think the profoundly mistaken character of Dworkin’s
jurisprudential project51 makes a Realist alternative especially attractive—and, if I were as impressed by
descriptive sociology of academia as Greenberg seems to be, I might note that most legal scholars have
opted en masse for the quasi-Realist empirical study of judicial behavior in recent years, as against
Dworkinian just-so stories. But I am not impressed by the herd behavior of academics, so let me just
rest on the merits of the arguments I offered against Dworkin’s position as a reason for taking the
‘replacement’ project of the Realists seriously.
Because Greenberg runs together the question about what the law is with the question how
courts should decide cases, he does not understand how I can claim that, “The Realist does not call for
‘naturalizing’ theory of adjudication in that range of cases where legal reasons are satisfactory
predictors of legal outcomes.”52 I, of course, agree with Greenberg that an argument for the
indeterminacy of legal reasoning depends on an account foof the nature of law: I say so explicitly.53
The Realists do not naturalize the theory of law, just the theory of adjudication. Only because
Greenberg conflates the question “what the law is” with the question “how should a court decide a
51

st

Id. See also, Brian Leiter, “The End of Empire: Dworkin and Jurisprudence in the 21 Century,” Rutgers
Law Journal 36 (2005): 185-___; “Explaining Theoretical Disagreement,” University of Chicago Law Review 76
(2009): 1215-___.
52

Naturalizing Jurisprudence, p. 41, quoted by Greenberg at p. __.

53

Naturalizing Jurisprudence, pp. 71-72.
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particular case”—the trademark error of all Dworkinians—does he find my disentangling of the two
positions puzzling.
I can conclude, happily, on a more positive note. It seems to me that Greenberg’s metareflections about naturalism in philosophy are mostly sensible, at least as I interpret them. I agree that
naturalism in philosophy is motivated by the thought that “it makes sense to copy the most successful
explanatory strategy we have,” and this entails both positive (try to emulate successful paradigms of
scientific explanation) and negative (don’t invoke as explanatory properties that have no standing in the
successful sciences) morals for philosophical practice.54 I agree that “we should be cautious about
constraints imposed for the negative” reason, since “it is easy to mistake a transient scientific
movement for the true scientific methodology”55 (Against that note of caution, however, I would point
out that there are fewer transient scientific fads than philosophical ones, so if one really had to choose,
it is not obvious that we should opt for the ‘philosophical’ one.) I also agree that “imposing strong
naturalistic constraints motivated by scruples about unreduced properties can diminish the fruitfulness
of our explanations,”56 but it is important to emphasize that this is no part of my naturalistic project in
legal or moral philosophy (especially through my work on Nietzsche). Indeed, I criticize Quine’s
behaviorism precisely on this score,57 namely that, as Greenberg puts it, “*h+igh-level sciences routinely
employ notions of which they cannot give a reductive account.”58 If behaviorist psychology had
succeeded, Quine would have been right, but in reality, it was an explanatory and predictive failure,
54

Greenberg, p. __. Cf. my discussion of naturalism in Nietzsche on Morality (London: Routledge, 2002),

Chapter 1.
55

Greenberg, p. __.

56

Greenberg, p. __

57

Naturalizing Jurisprudence, pp. 3-4.

58

Greenberg, p. __.
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supplanted by the cognitive revolution of the last fifty years. If the cognitive sciences are explanatory,
then we have every reason to subscribe to the ontology they require to do their explanatory work,
whether or not it is reducible to physics or biology. That has been central to my understanding of the
naturalism of both the Realists and of Nietzsche. On these issues, Greenberg and I appear to have no
dispute.
Reply to Julie Dickson
I have learned a great deal from Julie Dickson’s characteristically careful and probing
engagement with the views of other legal philosophers, in this case my own! Dickson observes, quite
correctly, that the “content of *my+ criticisms” of the methodology of jurisprudence “have shifted over
time,” and for precisely the considerations she calls attention to in note 26 of her paper, namely, the
unimpressive results of the current social science of law.59
Philosophers are often interested in the nature of various “things”: mind, space, time, even law.
The history of philosophy is littered with mistaken theories of things, in just about every case deemed
mistaken because of subsequent scientific discoveries. This history supports an inductive inference:
namely, that the methods of philosophy (the reliance on “intuitions” or what is “intuitively obvious” in
particular) are not particularly reliable, while the various methods of the sciences (even if not wholly
unitary) are much more reliable (cf. the conclusion of my discussion of Greenberg, above). Thus is born
the naturalistic hope in philosophy: if you want to want to know what some kind of X is like, find out
what the science of X says about it. There’s still lots for philosophers to do on this picture, since
scientists are notoriously lax about conceptual entailments and boundaries, and philosophers are often
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good on precisely these points. But on the classic philosophical question—what is X—scientific
methods are the ones that an induction over past successes and failures gives us most reason to trust.
That was the spirit in which I approached one aspect of the project of naturalizing jurisprudence,
but my initial optimism faded the more I learned about the epistemically feeble condition of the social
scientific work on law and courts. It became clear, alas, that the existing “science” was quite
predictively unimpressive—perhaps adequate for puncturing the pretensions of constitutional law
professors who think legal doctrine explains decisions, but wholly inadequate to warrant confidence
that it had meaningfully cut the joints of the socio-legal world. But Dickson is quite correct that on my
view it is possible “that, in the future, empirical research into legal phenomena…may improve”
sufficiently to warrant epistemic confidence. And thus her fair questions about “the direction of
justification or support” between scientific findings and the nature of law, or any X, deserve a response.
The only claim I have defended in my work is (to quote Dickson’s gloss) “that the explanatory
power of the Attitudinal Model [or a genuinely predictively successful theory of judicial behavior], itself
established…on the grounds of its predictive power in empirical studies, vindicates or gives us reason to
endorse Raz’s hard positivism.”60 Dickson’s apparent uncertainty about the direction of epistemic
support at work in this claim is evident in her observation that:
Leiter seems to be saying that hard positivism is supported by the explanatory power of the
Attitudinal Model, based on the latter’s predictive power, but that in order even to explain
what the Attitudinal Model is, to differentiate it sufficiently from the Legal Model, and
hence to be able to delineate and then test the relative predictive strengths of each of the
postulated models, we need hard positivism to be true. So, in Leiter’s explanation of it, the
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Attitudinal Model appear to need the hard positivist view of law to be true in order even to
delineate itself as a distinct model and hence get the testing it requires off the ground; but
then, having thus got itself off the ground, and having established, based on its predictive
power in empirical studies, that it outperforms its rival model, this then vindicates hard
positivism?61
I have italicized the portion of Dickson’s account of my position that is at issue. The Attitudinal Model
does not “need hard positivism to be true”; it needs to assume a hard positivist account of law in order
to generate its explanatory and predictive model. That the model involving such assumptions is
predictively powerful is then a reason to think its assumptions warrant credence. If a model that
rejected hard positivist assumptions about the nature of law were more predictively fruitful, then that
would constitute a reason, from the naturalistic point of view, to think those assumptions more
plausible.
Dickson is correct to observe that Ian Farrell’s critique of my earlier view persuaded me that
conceptual analysis need not be “glorified lexicography,” and that there might be a role for “modest”
conceptual analysis in jurisprudence.

Of course, modest conceptual analysis, even if it is “an exercise

in sophisticated conceptual ethnography,”62 will yield immodest results if the concept in question is
what I called in Naturalizing Jurisprudence a “Hermeneutic” one63--that is, one whose reference is fixed
by the role it plays in how people make sense of themselves and their social world.64 She usefully
identifies my ambiguous comments on this point in my earlier discussion of Farrell’s account of modest
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conceptual analysis.65 So let me see if I can now clarify the matter here. With respect to Natural Kind
Concepts,66 modest conceptual analysis tries to clarify how the “folk” are using the concept, which then
permits us to see whether or not it picks out the natural kind in question (the latter being a deliverance
of the pertinent science). With respect to Hermeneutic Concepts, however, the clarification of the
concept entails the clarification of the referent. If it turns out that by the Hermeneutic Concept of
“wolverine” we mean the “mascot of the University of Michigan sports teams,” then modest conceptual
analysis of “wolverine” also tells us what wolverines are, from the hermeneutic point of view. Of
course, it also turns out that this concept of wolverine does not successfully pick out the referent of the
Natural Kind Concept of wolverine, but the latter (the referent, that is) is not a discovery of modest
conceptual analysis, but of science. If that is right, then the most important methodological issue in
general jurisprudence is whether the concept of law is, or is not, a Hermeneutic Concept. As I noted in
Naturalizing Jurisprudence,67 almost all 20th-century legal philosophers, with the possible exception of
the Scandinavian Realists, have assumed that it is. But what argument do they have for that
assumption? Many Natural Kind Concepts figure in the self-understanding of human agents—
“wolverine” for University of Michigan sports fans is, again, an example, and so too is baptismal “water”
for the Catholic (it need not be H20!). And while we understand that there are also Hermeneutic
Concepts of “wolverine” and “water,” we also understand that wolverines and water are really the kinds
of things picked out by biology and chemistry.
But why is the latter claim true? It is obviously not meant as a sociological claim about what the
“folk” believe about the concept of “water”: after all, it is most likely that the folk think water is a clear,
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potable liquid (or whatever is used in Baptismal ceremonies!), and wolverines are furry dog-like
creatures used as mascots by the University of Michigan sports teams. So when we say that the Natural
Kind Concepts of water and wolverine have priority over the Hermeneutic Concepts in specifying what
the referents of these terms really are, what we are actually saying is that we have other epistemic and
pragmatic reasons for privileging one concept over the other. That’s easy enough to specify in the case
of “water,” for example: the epistemic and practical advantages of acknowledging that the macroproperties of some clear, potable liquids are explicable by the micro-properties of two parts hydrogen
and one part oxygen have now been borne out by more than two hundred years of scientific and
engineering triumphs predicated on an appreciation of the molecular constitution of the observable
macro-properties of liquids. If, in fact, a powerful social-scientific theory of law emerged, I suspect its
epistemic and pragmatic advantages would trump anyone’s intuitions about how the “folk” use the
concept.
Of course, law is not a natural kind like water or wolverine, since it has no distinctive microconstitution, one that could be specified by one of the natural sciences. But if “law” can not be
individuated by its natural constitution, then the question arises why a human artifact, like law, should
be thought to have an essential constitution at all?68 Precisely because Hermeneutic Concepts figure in
human self-understandings, it turns out that all of them have been resistant to robust or stable analysis
in terms of their essential characteristics, or so the history of philosophy for the last two thousand years
suggests. I would not want to be a slave to fashion, to be sure, but two thousand years, at least in
matters philosophical, does seem like a long time. As Dickson notes, it does appear “startling” to
conclude “that theoretical inquiry regarding a familiar and actually existing social institution having farreaching effects on the lives of those living under it cannot yield knowledge of that social
68
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instutitoninstitution itself.”69 But that wasn’t quite my claim. I am sure there is lots of sociological,
anthropological, and psychological knowledge about law to be had. What I doubt is that there is any
intuition-derived knowledge about the “essence” of the Hermeneutic Concept of law to be had. We can
have fleeting, ethnographic knowledge about how the folk “around here” think about law, but that
would be all that is on offer.
Dickson, of course, correctly notices that I am skeptical of the epistemic value of intuitions about
the extension of concepts—a skepticism hostage, as just noted, to the question whether or not law is a
Hermeneutic Concept. She doesn’t get my skepticism quite right, however. She ascribes to me the
complaint that the “intuitions” underlying conceptual analysis in jurisprudence “are empirically
unsupported and unrepresentative in character.”70 The first charge is certainly one I make, but the
second is not. I consider it an open empirical question whether the intuitions in questions are
representative or not. That Anglophone jurisprudence is Oxford-centric (in a way no other branch of
philosophy is, I should add) raises the specter of a possible selection effect on the intuitions about law,
authority, obligations, and so on that are thought to count, but only empirical inquiry, of the kind
pursued by experimental philosophers in epistemology and philosophy of language, can, can determine
that that’s what has happened.71 Dickson, however, offers the following cautionary note regarding such
inquiry:
*T+he kind of research regarding people’s actual intuitions to which experimental
philosophy has so enthusiastically turned can at best supplement and can certainly not
69
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replace the kinds of arguments which legal philosophers develop and attempt to defend.
Data regarding people’s intuitions about law and other legal concepts may be all very well,
but we still have to decide what to do with the data so collected (including, for example,
what to do with it if it reveals disagreements in intuitions hailing from those from the same
and/or different cultural backgrounds….).
To start, it is very important to emphasize what an absolutely central role intuitions in the relevant
sense actually play in legal philosophy--and the puzzle that emphasis presents for a position like
Dickson’s, in the passage just quoted. As Hart aptly observed in “The Postscript,” the “starting-point”
for his task in The Concept of Law was “the widespread common knowledge of the salient features of a
modern municipal legal system which on page 3 of this book I attribute to any educated man,”72 and
thus the argument of the book is replete with appeals, explicit and implicit, to what “any educated man”
would intuitively recognize: e.g., that there is a difference between having an obligation and being
obliged to do something; or that legal rules can persist in force after the demise of the sovereign who
first promulgated them; and so on.

He is not alone in that approach. Just to take one of many

possible examples, Joseph Raz claims, explicitly, that one of the two main arguments for the “sources
thesis” is that it “reflects and explicates our conception of law,” where this is, presumably, the
conception of law held, however inchoately, by the educated man familiar with a modern municipal
legal system. Hart and Raz never adduce any evidence of what “any educated man” knows or believes,
but in that regard they are no different than traditional epistemologists or philosophers of language
appealing to “ordinary” intuitions about knowledge or reference.
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If, as Dickson says in the passage quoted, above, legal philosophers must decide which intuitions
“are most relevant in understanding law’s important and significant features” and whether some of the
intuitions of Hart’s “educated men” “may be confused, mistaken, insufficient focused or vague,”73
butyet it is still supposed to the case that the concept in question is a Hermeneutic Concept, then it is
fair to ask what the criteria are by which the theorist sorts the wheat from the chaff? That it seems to
make sense in an Oxford seminar room? Or that it would be reflectively endorsed by the “folk” if
suitably explained? Or something else? It could turn out that the concepts related to law by which the
folk make sense of themselves and their social world are, in fact, confused and vague, and so the
“cleaning up” done by philosophers might really signify a betrayal of the idea that underlies the work of,
e.g., Hart and Raz, namely, that “law” is a Hermeneutic Concept. But once we give up on hermeneutic
constraints on the concept of law, why not go all the way and prefer the concept of law that figures in
potent explanatory schema?
No one has thought more carefully about methodological issues in jurisprudence than Julie
Dickson, so I hope these thoughts in reply to her criticisms will stimulate her further work on the
subject.
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